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T H E D E M IS E OF T H E R E C O R D IN G
A C T A S A R U L E OF P R O P E R T Y

Robert M. Honea

THE DEMISE OF THE RECORDING ACT
AS A RULE OF PROPERTY IN THE STATE OF ARKANSAS
For as long as there have been human beings battles have been fought over ownership o f
real property. For as long as human beings have been form ing civilized societies, rules have
been adopted for the purpose o f avoiding battles over ownership o f real property.
The basic rules which were adopted in England hundreds o f years ago to deal w ith this
problem are essentially the same rules we are a ll fam iliar w ith today — i f it concerns real
property, it has to be in w riting, it has to be signed and acknowledged, it has to be placed in the
public record, and, most im portantly o f all, the public record is determinative o f title .
The last mentioned item is critical to the goal o f avoiding battles over ownership o f real
property. The reason the foregoing rules avoid such battles is precisely because everyone agrees
that the owner reflected in the public record is the owner, and everyone agrees that everyone can
rely on the public record to establish the identity o f that owner.
Arkansas became a state on June 15, 1836. In the follow ing years, Arkansas’ legislators
met and adopted statutes dealing w ith a variety o f issues, to include real property. Included in
those statutes was a piece o f legislation commonly referred to as the recording act, now codified
at A.C .A. §14-15-404. The recording act, on its face, says that a recorded instrument controls
over an unrecorded instrument, absent “ actual notice” o f the unrecorded instrument.
Although the phrase “ actual notice” would seem, at firs t glance, to be relatively simple to
understand, interpret, and apply, the reality is quite the opposite. In the real w orld, the phrase
that is actually applied is “ inquiry notice,” a phrase which has a vastly different meaning (or not
—it all depends on what you think “ actual notice” actually means).
This paper w ill attempt to provide an explanation o f how we got from “ actual notice” to
“ inquiry notice,” w ill define and describe “ inquiry notice” to the extent it is possible to do so,
and w ill conclude by attempting to state the current rules o f property in the State o f Arkansas
w ith respect to how one goes about determining who owns real property.
I.

W hy Have Rules o f Property?

The Arkansas Supreme Court has answered this rhetorical question eloquently, on
m ultiple occasions, beginning in 1840.
“ It is a ll im portant to the interest o f society, that the rules o f property
should be definitely settled, and that they should possess uniform ity and
consistency. Moody v. W alker, 3 A rk. 147 (1840).
“ In our body o f law there have grown up a number o f rules and principles
governing the law o f real estate w hich have become known as “ rules o f
property.” W hile it may be argued that many o f such rules are based upon
technicalities, it is nevertheless true that these rules, and the technicalities
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upon which they are based, have come into existence and have been
continued because o f the ever present need fo r stability and predictability
in this fie ld o f the law. Were this not the case then chaos soon would be
the result and property values would dim inish in direct relationship to the
degree o f instability existing in the law o f this or any other state as it
m ight be applied to real property. Consequently, economic and moral
necessity have dictated the establishment o f such rules and the technical
basis o f many o f them. Thus it is that the m aintaining o f the integrity o f
such rules devolves upon this tribunal. General welfare requires a
continuation o f the observance o f such rules and may in special cases, as
in the case at bar, be found to require a decision in accordance w ith these
principles even though the court may entertain great sympathy for
individuals in a particular situation.” K irkham v. M alone, 232 A rk. 390,
336 S.W. 2d. 46 (1960).
There can be no doubt that the recording act, and the recording system in general, are
rules o f property. In Peterson v. Simpson, 286 A rk. 177, 690 S.W 2d. 720 (1985), the Arkansas
Supreme Court adopted the Duhig rule as a rule o f property in the State o f Arkansas. In reaching
its decision, the court had the follow ing to say w ith respect to the recording system.
“ In the U nited States, the recording system is the only method we have fo r
keeping track o f the ownership o f m ineral rights. The recording system
only makes available the evidence o f title , evidence w hich is meaningless
u n til interpreted by a title examiner. Rules like those that comprise the
Duhig rule exist prim arily to make it possible fo r title examiners to
interpret the evidence they fin d in the recorder’ s office. W ithout such
objective rules o f construction, marketable title , and thus a market in
m ineral rights, would not be possible. The in itia l question faced by a
court that is dealing w ith a Duhig problem is not whether to fo llo w Duhig
or some other rule o f construction. The firs t question is whether to set
aside a ll objective rules o f construction and engage in a subjective inquiry
into the meaning o f the deed or [instead] to fin d the intent o f the parties
objectively according to accepted rules o f construction.
The general criteria fo r making this threshold decision are clear.
The goal o f interpretation is finding, i f possible, the actual intent o f the
parties. Relevant facts, which are admitted by the parties or are proper
matters fo r ju d ic ia l notice, can be taken into account i f doing so w ill not
injure the rights o f subsequent purchasers or undermine reliance on the
recording system. When, however, fairness to individual parties and
preservation o f a viable recording system are in conflict, preservation o f
the recording system, being more im portant, must control.”
Returning to the rhetorical question “ w hy have rules o f property?” , the answer is that
public p o licy requires it. It is in the best interest o f a civilized society to have stability and
predictability in this fie ld o f the law.
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II.

The Recording A ct

In the fa ll o f 1836 the legislature o f the State o f Arkansas met fo r the firs t tim e and
commissioned the preparation o f a code o f c iv il and crim inal laws, to be considered fo r adoption
by the general assembly at its next session, in these terms:
“ That the governor shall appoint, by and w ith the advice and consent o f
the senate, two competent persons to revise and arrange the statute laws o f
this state, and prepare such a code o f c iv il and crim inal laws, as, in their
opinion, may be necessary fo r the government o f this state, in accordance
w ith the constitution; and the persons so appointed shall make their report
at the next session o f the general assembly, whether it be a regular or
called session.”
Sam C. Roane and W illiam M cK . B all, Esquires, were duly appointed by the governor,
commenced upon their mission, and presented the results o f their w ork at the October session o f
the general assembly o f the State o f Arkansas in 1837. “ The statutes so revised and presented,
were referred to appropriate committees, reported to one or the other house, and passed
separately, and w ith such amendments as seemed proper.”
A gentleman named A lbert Pike was assigned responsibility fo r preparing an index to the
foregoing statutes. A preface to the statutes prepared by M r. Pike provides interesting reading.
One o f the topics addressed by M r. Pike in his preface was the reason w hy the preparation o f a
code o f laws was necessary. (The Revised Statutes o f the State o f Arkansas).
“ [I]n no state was ever such a revision called fo r, more needful fo r the
common weal. Taking the organic law as the basis o f legislation, the
legislative bodies o f M issouri and Arkansas territories had erected, at
different times, and under the direction o f diverse architects, an unseemly
and incongruous superstructure thereon; composed o f statutes, enacted in
part by the legislature o f each territory, in part by the legislature o f the
Louisiana territory, and in part by the governor and judges o f A rkansas
territory. The whole edifice, erected in such manner, and under the
auspices o f legislation so conflicting and in a rtific ia l, resembled some o f
those old baronial castles, s till extant in England, where the gothic mingles
w ith the Corinthian, the D oric w ith the Chinese style o f architecture, as
different ages have added different portions to the heterogeneous
structure.”
The Revised Statutes o f the State o f Arkansas ran some 966 pages, and included chapters
fo r counties, county lines, county seats, courts, judges, and clerks. The Revised Statutes also
included chapters on conveyances o f real estate, chapter 31, and recorders, chapter 124. W ith
respect to the last two chapters, everything you would expect to see in a comprehensive
recording system is reflected in the statutes (in fact, they are the same statutes we s till use today),
w ith one notable exception - what we now refer to as the recording act is nowhere to be seen.
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Instead, the recording act was adopted in 1846, and became effective on December 21, 1846.
The recording act remains unchanged to this day, and reads as follow s:
“ (a) Every deed, bond, or instrument o f w ritin g affecting the title , in law
or equity, to any real or personal property, w ith in this state which is, or
may be, required by law to be acknowledged or proved and recorded shall
be constructive notice to a ll persons from the tim e the instrument is file d
for record in the office o f the recorder o f the proper county.
(b) No deed, bond, or instrument o f w ritin g fo r the conveyance o f any real
estate, or by which the title thereto may be affected in law or equity, made
or executed after December 21, 1846, shall be good or valid against a
subsequent purchaser o f the real estate fo r a valuable consideration
w ithout actual notice thereof or against any creditor o f the person
executing such an instrument obtaining a judgm ent or decree which by
law may be a lie n upon the real estate unless the deed, bond, or
instrument, duly executed and acknowledged or proved as required by
law, is file d fo r record in the office o f the clerk and ex o ffic io recorder o f
the county where the real estate is situated.” A .C .A . §14-15-404.
I have been unable to discover an explanation fo r w hy the recording act was not included
in the original Revised Statutes o f the State o f Arkansas adopted in 1837. Recording acts were
w e ll known at the tim e. Indeed, in a case decided in 1855, the Arkansas Supreme Court
discussed the registry acts o f England and other states at length, Byers v. Engles, 16 A rk. 543
(1855). Nevertheless, whatever the explanation may be, the reality is that although a ll o f the
other elements o f a recording system were adopted as the law o f the State o f Arkansas
contemporaneously w ith statehood, the recording act did not arrive u n til 10 years later.
For purposes o f this paper, the recording act may be distilled down to the follow ing:
“ Every...instrum ent...shall be constructive notice to all persons from the
tim e the instrument is filed fo r record....”
“ No deed...shall be good or valid against a subsequent purchaser...
w ithout actual notice.. .unless the deed.. .is filed fo r record....”
HE

“ A ctual Notice” and Statutory Interpretation

When I embarked upon this project I assumed that since the recording act is a statute, and
since it is the constitutional responsibility o f the courts to interpret and enforce statutes, and since
the recording act was adopted in 1846 and has remained unchanged ever since, I would begin m y
research by finding the firs t case in w hich the courts interpreted the recording act, and
specifically the firs t case in w hich Arkansas’ courts interpreted the meaning o f the phrase “ actual
notice.” W hat I found surprised me - as far as I can te ll, Arkansas’ courts have never been asked
to interpret, and have never attempted to interpret, the phrase “ actual notice” as a matter o f
statutory interpretation.
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I w ill discuss in the next section m y conclusions concerning the question o f where
“ inquiry notice” comes from , since it is not the end product o f ju d ic ia l interpretation o f the
statutory phrase “ actual notice.” In this section I w ill devote m y attention to a hypothetical
question - what would happen i f the courts were ever asked to determine the meaning o f the
phrase “ actual notice,” as a matter o f statutory interpretation?
The jud icial branch has been interpreting the laws enacted by the legislative branch from
the tim e the constitution was adopted to the present. The rules o f statutory interpretation adopted
and applied by the ju d ic ia l branch have been distilled over the years into relatively simple
term inology, the basics o f which are set forth below.
“ The firs t rule o f statutory construction is to construe the statute ju st as it
reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in
common language. We construe statutes so that, i f possible, every word is
given meaning and effect. I f the language o f a statute is clear and
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, it is unnecessary
to resort to the rules o f statutory interpretation. When a statute is clear, it
is given its plain meaning, and this court w ill not search fo r legislative
intent; rather, that intent must be gathered from the plain meaning o f the
language used.” Roberson v. P h illip s County E lection Commission, 2014
Ark. 480,449 S.W. 3d. 694 (2014).
“ A statute is considered ambiguous i f it is open to more than one
construction. When a statute is ambiguous, this court must interpret it
according to legislative intent and our review becomes an examination o f
the whole act. In reviewing the act in its entirety, this court w ill reconcile
provisions to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible in an effort
to give effect to every part. In addition, this court must look at the
legislative history, the language, and the subject matter involved.”
Simpson v. C avalry SPVI, LLC , 2014 A rk. 363,440 S.W. 3d. 335 (2014).
“ The basic rule o f statutory construction to which a ll interpretive guides
must yie ld is to give effect to the intent o f the general assembly. When a
statute is ambiguous,...we must interpret it according to the legislative
intent, and its review becomes an examination o f the whole act. Finally, a
statute is ambiguous only where it is open to two or more constructions, or
where it is o f such obscure or doubtful meaning that reasonable minds
m ight disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning. In ascertaining
legislative intent, we look to the statutory language, legislative history,
and other appropriate matters.” G afford v. A llstate Insurance Company,
2015 A rk. 110,459 S.W. 3d. 277 (2015).
Because this is a hypothetical discussion and it is d iffic u lt to predict how the Arkansas
Supreme Court m ight apply the foregoing rules o f statutory interpretation to the phrase “ actual
notice,” I am going to cheat a little b it and only look at the question o f statutory interpretation
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from this perspective: is it possible to read the recording act in such a way that the phrase “ actual
notice” means “ inquiry notice,” as the latter phrase has been defined by the cases?
The
definition o f inquiry notice, as established by the case law, is as follow s:
“ A subsequent purchaser w ill be deemed to have actual notice o f a prior
interest in the property i f he is aware o f such facts and circumstances as
w ould put a person o f ordinary intelligence and prudence on such inquiry
that, i f diligently pursued, w ould lead to knowledge o f these prior
interests. This type o f notice must be enough to excite attention or put a
party on guard to call fo r an inquiry.” (Emphasis supplied). K illa m v.
Texas O il & Gas C arp., 303 A rk. 547, 798 S.W. 2d. 419 (1990).
A t this juncture I cannot help pointing out that i f a person is “ deemed” to have actual
notice, then that person, by definition, does not actually have actual notice. The very definition
o f inquiry notice, as stated by the courts, therefore conclusively establishes that actual notice and
inquiry notice are tw o different things. One w ould therefore th in k that i f the courts were ever
asked to address “ actual notice” as a matter o f statutory interpretation, the courts would conclude
that actual notice, whatever else it m ight be, is not inquiry notice.
Continuing w ith my hypothetical question, i f you place the recording act and the
foregoing definition o f “ inquiry notice” side by side, and ask yourself i f it is possible to read the
phrase “ actual notice” as “ inquiry notice,” the common sense conclusion is that it is absolutely
impossible to interpret actual notice to mean inquiry notice. A pplying the basic rules o f statutory
interpretation confirms the va lid ity o f this common sense reaction. The dictionary definitions o f
actual and notice are as follow s:
Actual: Existing in fact and not merely potentially. Existing in fact or
reality. N ot false or apparent.
Notice: W arning or inform ation o f something
It would seem that there w ould be little d iffic u lty in giving these words their plain
meaning and interpreting the statute in accordance w ith the dictionary definitions. Certainly it
would be d iffic u lt to describe these words as ambiguous.
Assuming arguendo it is possible to fin d am biguity in the statute, the rules o f statutory
interpretation require that the statute be interpreted in accordance w ith legislative intent. The
intent o f the legislature in adopting the recording act is readily apparent. The purpose o f the
recording act is to provide certainty w ith respect to ownership o f real property. It is a statement
o f public policy - in the words o f the A rkansas Supreme Court: “ It is all-im portant to the interest
o f society, that the rules o f property should be definitely settled, and that they should possess
uniform ity and consistency.” M oody v. W alker, 3 A rk. 147 (1840). Considering the statute in
the context o f legislative intent, the conclusion to be reached is, once again, that actual notice
means actual notice, not what m ight be known or could be known or should be known.
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The logical conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion is that i f the Arkansas
Supreme Court were asked to interpret the recording act in a vacuum, ignoring all o f the case law
concerning inquiry notice, and looking only at the statute itself, the Arkansas Supreme Court
w ould conclude that actual notice means actual notice —not what a person could know, m ight
know, or should know, but what the person actually knows. Certainly, you would not expect the
Arkansas Supreme Court to look at the four comers o f the act and conclude that actual notice
does not mean actual notice, it means inquiry notice.
IV .

I f “ Inquiry Notice” Is N o t the Product o f Judicial Interpretation o f the Phrase “ Actual
Notice,” Then What Is It?

The recording act says that once a document is recorded in the deed records, it is
“ constructive notice” to everyone from the tim e it is recorded. Makes sense —what is the point
o f a recording system, i f you are not charging everyone w ith knowledge o f everything that has
been recorded?
The statute also says that a recorded instrument beats an unrecorded instrument absent
“ actual notice” o f the unrecorded instrument. Again, makes sense - it ju st w ouldn’t be righ t fo r
someone who knows the whole story to prevail over the party who was firs t in time.
W hat about “ inquiry notice?” The statute does not say anything about “ inquiry notice,”
yet the case law is replete w ith discussion and application o f inquiry notice, to the point that the
concept o f actual notice which appears in the statute is, fo r all practical purposes, rendered
meaningless. Where in the w orld does inquiry notice come from?
The answer is that inquiry notice has nothing to do w ith the recording act. Rather, it is
purely judge made law (common law) which existed before the recording act was adopted, and
w hich has continued to be applied to the present day, w ithout regard to the recording act.
In 1841, five years before the recording act was adopted, the Arkansas Supreme Court
decided the case o f P orter v. Clements, 3 A rk. 364 (1841), a case involving a dispute over the
ownership o f slaves. Clements needed money and had four slaves that were w orth about
$1,500.00. Clements cut a deal w ith Ph ill ip s pursuant to which Phillips gave Clements $400.00
and Clements gave P hillips a b ill o f sale fo r the slaves. The b ill o f sale, on its face, purported to
convey the slaves unconditionally. P hillips then assigned the b ill o f sale to Porter. Clements
later asserted that he actually pawned the slaves to P hillips - stated differently, Clements took
the position that the “ deal” was that i f Clements w ould give P hillips $500.00 w ith in two and oneh a lf years, he would get the slaves back, otherwise P hillips got to keep them. Before the two and
one-half years passed, Clements tendered the $500.00 to Porter and asked fo r the return o f the
slaves. Porter took the position that the b ill o f sale was absolute on its face, that he did not have
any actual notice o f the “ deal” asserted by Clements, that he was an innocent purchaser, and that
he therefore owned the slaves.
Drawing an analogy to the topic presently under discussion, the b ill o f sale w ould be
record title , and the “ deal” w ould be the unrecorded instrument.
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Porter lost the case, not because there was any proof that he had actual notice, but rather
because the court found that Porter had knowledge o f facts which put him on inquiry, and that i f
he had conducted a diligent inquiry, he would have learned about the “ deal.” In reaching its
conclusion, the court discussed the distinction between inquiry notice and actual notice in these
term s:
“ ...and it is equally as d iffic u lt to define w ith precision the rules which
regulate im plied or constructive notice; fo r it depends upon a ll the varied
circumstances o f the case, and whether there has been an exercise o f
ordinary diligence and understand in making inquiries. Suspicion o f
notice is not sufficient; there must be clear and strong circumstances, in
the absence o f actual notice.” (Emphasis supplied).
Before the recording act was adopted, the courts applied these same ju d ic ia l concepts to
transactions involving real property. In 1853, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided the case o f
R inggold v. Waggoner, 14 A rk. 69 (1853), a case involving events that occurred in 1844, p rior to
the adoption o f the recording act. In that case John Waggoner, who was then in financial straits
and being vigorously pursued by creditors, conveyed a piece o f land to a relative, Edmond P.
Waggoner, who then sold the land fo r the fu ll market value to Edwin T. Burr. The creditors o f
John Waggoner file d suit, asserting that the conveyance from John Waggoner to Edmond P.
Waggoner was a fraudulent conveyance, and arguing that the subsequent conveyance from
Edmond P. Waggoner to Edwin T. B urr should be set aside on the ground that Edwin T. B urr
knew or should have known that the conveyance to Edmond P. Waggoner was a fraudulent
conveyance. B urr defended on the ground that he was entitled to be protected as an innocent
purchaser. The court held against Burr, finding that even i f Burr did not have actual notice that
the conveyance was fraudulent, he had inquiry notice that the conveyance was fraudulent.
“ ...he had sufficient notice to have put him on enquiry as a man o f
ordinary prudence and experience in business transactions; and when the
means o f inform ation are afforded to a party, he w ill not be allowed to
protect him self by the want o f notice, because he did not choose to be
inform ed.”
The recording act is not mentioned in the decision.
One year later the Arkansas Supreme Court decided the case o f H ardy v. Heard, 15 A rk.
184. In that case Rogers, who then held title to the W /2 o f the NE/4, entered into an agreement
w ith Montgomery to sell one acre on a bond fo r title (what we would today call a contract o f sale
or a contract fo r deed). Nothing was recorded, but Montgomery went into possession.
In 1848, Rogers executed and recorded a deed conveying the W /2 NE/4 to Hardy,
reserving “ ...a ll pieces and parcels o f land granted, bargained, and sold to sundry persons...in
one and two acre lo ts ....” In 1849, a judgm ent was levied on M ontgom ery’s interest in the one
acre, and it was sold at an execution sale to Heard and Sloan. Heard and Sloan paid o ff the
remaining balance due Rogers, and obtained a quitclaim deed fo r the one acre from Rogers.
Heard and Sloan then sued Hardy, seeking to quiet title to the one acre.
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The court concluded Hardy had inquiry notice o f the executory bond fo r title , and
therefore took subject to the bond fo r title .
“ ...[H ardy] would have to be held chargeable w ith notice o f the prior
rights o f Montgomery, on the principle, now universally admitted, that
whatever is sufficient to put a purchaser on enquiry, in considered as
conveying notice.
[Citations om itted.]
This is sometimes called
constructive notice, or notice in law, and which is no more than evidence
o f notice, the presumption o f which is so violent, that it cannot be suffered
to be controverted. [Citations omitted.]
Once again, the recording act is not mentioned in the decision.
In 1855, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided the case o f H am ilton v. Fowlkes, 16 Ark.
340 (1855). Although the case was decided after the enactment o f the recording act, a ll o f the
relevant events occurred w ell before 1846. Although the case does not mention the recording
act, it nevertheless applies the same substantive legal concepts as are embodied in the recording
act:
“ Though the agreement was not upon the public records o f the county
where the land was situated, yet, i f Fowlkes became the incumbrancer or
purchaser thereof, w ith notice o f the agreement, it is w e ll settled that he is
bound thereby. On the other hand, it is equally w e ll settled, that i f he was
an innocent incumbrancer or purchaser, fo r a valuable consideration, in
good faith, w ithout notice o f the agreement, he is in no way to be bound,
nor is he to be prejudiced thereby. These are fam iliar rules o f law,
requirinp no reference to authority to sustain them.” (Emphasis supplied).
The court discussed notice in the follow ing terms:
“ M r. Kent says: it is indeed d iffic u lt to define, w ith precision, the rules
which regulate im plied or constructive notice, fo r it depends upon the
in fin ite ly varied circumstances o f each case. The general doctrine is that
whatever puts a party upon inquiry amounts, in judgm ent o f law, to notice,
provided the inquiry becomes a duty, as in the case o f purchasers and
creditors, and w ould lead to the knowledge o f the requisite fact by the
exercise o f ordinary diligence and understanding.”
The court then went on to discuss the relationship between notice and actual possession:
“ .. .where a person is in open and actual possession o f land, even though
he claimed by an equitable title , that possession is sufficient to put a
subsequent purchaser upon inquiry, as to the actual rights, and the nature
o f the claim o f such occupant; and is constructive notice o f the nature and
extent o f those rights.”
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Byers v. Engles, 16 A rk. 543 (1855) is the firs t reported decision I was able to find
applying the recording act to events which occurred after 1846. In Byers, Harvey Engles held
record title to a tract o f land. A judgment was entered against Engles, and the property was sold
at a sheriff’ s sale to Byers. John Engles then sued, presenting an unrecorded deed from Harvey
Engles to John Engles, and asserted that the judgm ent sale was a n u llity , as Harvey Engles had
conveyed the land to John Engles before the judgm ent lien attached.

The case quotes the recording act verbatim , then goes into a lengthy discussion o f the
history o f recording acts and the evils recording acts are intended to eliminate. The court then
went on to fin d that John Engles was in actual possession o f the land at a ll times relevant to the
litigation, that actual possession is equivalent to “ registry notice,” and that Byers was therefore
“ deemed” to have knowledge o f the unrecorded conveyance from Harvey Engles to John Engles.
The case does not discuss the definition o f “ actual notice” as that phrase is used in the
recording act, and does not recognize that there is any possibility o f a contradiction between the
statutory phrase “ actual notice” and the ju d ic ia lly created concept o f “ inquiry notice.”
I have expended a good deal o f energy reviewing recording act cases from the 1840’s to
the present. The cases routinely apply inquiry notice to recording act cases, repeatedly reciting
words to the effect that a person is “ charged w ith notice o f’ or is “ deemed to have notice of"
anything that m ight have been discovered upon inquiry (and expanding what, exactly, is
sufficient to put a person “ on enquiry” ). I have not found a single case, however, which
addresses the apparent co n flict between the statutory phrase actual notice and the ju d ic ia l phrase
inquiry notice. Specifically, I have been unable to find a single case addressing this issue as a
matter o f statutory interpretation - what did the legislature intend when it adopted the recording
act, and said a recorded instrument beats an unrecorded instrument, absent “ actual notice” ?
W hat does the statutory phrase “ actual notice” actually mean?
V.

Black’ s Law D ictionary

I f the foregoing discussion has not been sufficient to give you a headache, the lengthy
definition o f “ notice” in B lack’s Law D ictionary is sure to give you one. The definition is too
long to quote here, so a copy is attached as an exhibit to this paper. M y only comment here is
that the Black’ s Law D ictionary definition o f “ notice” is as schizophrenic as the foregoing
discussion —as I read the definition, Black’ s Law D ictionary says that the phrase actual notice
may mean either actual notice or inquiry notice or both.
“ Actual notice has been defined as notice expressly and actually given,
and brought home to the party directly. The term “ actual notice,”
however, is generally given a wider meaning as embracing tw o classes,
express and im plied ....”
I am not sure w hat to make o f the Black’ s Law D ictionary definition. It can be read as
either supporting the proposition that “ actual notice” means actual knowledge, or it can be read
as supporting the proposition that “ actual notice” means inquiry notice.
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V I.

Public Policy vs. The Judicial D efinition - Is It Time For A Legislative Solution?

The ju d ic ia l definition is founded upon equitable considerations - the do-right rule. The
ju d icia l definition seeks to achieve the m orally righ t result in every case. The de facto result, as
a matter o f public policy, is that the importance o f rules o f property, and specifically the
recording act, is subordinated to the societal need to achieve the “ righ t” result in every case. The
public p o licy underlying rules o f property is exactly the opposite - the societal need fo r stability
in this area o f the law outweighs the importance o f achieving the “ righ t” result in every single
case.
As we sit here today, the public p olicy o f the State o f Arkansas is the ju d ic ia lly created
one - the needs o f the one outweigh the needs o f the many. As Tom D aily once to ld me, the
word “ actual” in the recording act is as silent as the p in psoriasis. The question then becomes
whether this should remain the public policy o f the State o f Arkansas, or i f instead the legislature
should alter this state o f affairs by amending the recording act so that it accomplishes the public
policy goals underlying rules o f property - the societal needs o f the many outweigh the needs o f
the few in this area o f the law.
I f you agree that a change is needed, the legislative solution would be a simple one —
substitute “ knowledge” fo r “ notice” :
“ No deed...shall be good or valid against a subsequent purchaser...
w ithout actual knowledge.. .unless the deed is file d fo r record....”
V II.

So Where Does A ll o f This Leave Us?

Although it would be wonderful fo r a ll o f us to get in the magic way back machine and
create a w orld in which actual notice means actual knowledge, it is not going to happen absent an
amendment to the statute. The ju d icia l concepts o f inquiry notice have been repeated and
enforced and extended to the point that they are now, in and o f themselves, a rule o f property.
Stated differently, although never directly addressing the issue, as a practical matter the courts
have defined “ actual notice” to mean “ inquiry notice.” We are therefore le ft w ith the conclusion
that the actual notice o f the recording act is useless, and that the governing rule o f property in the
State o f A rkansas is judge made law —inquiry notice.
W hat does inquiry notice mean? The definition has been stated and repeated in m ultiple
decisions. A good example is the follow ing statement from K illa m v. Texas O il and Gas Corp.,
supra :
“ A subsequent purchaser w ill be deemed to have actual notice o f a prior
interest in the property i f he is aware o f such facts and circumstances as
would put a person o f ordinary intelligence and prudence on such inquiry
that, i f diligently pursued, would lead to knowledge o f these prior
interests. This type o f notice must be enough to excite attention or put a
party on guard to call fo r inquiry.”
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Turning to the cases themselves, the fo llo w ing is an illustrative (but I am sure by no
means exhaustive) summary o f specific factual situations in w hich the courts have concluded the
evidence was sufficient to place a prospective purchaser on inquiry notice.
Actual possession. Anyone buying a piece o f real property is deemed to know who is in
actual possession o f the property. W alls v. Hum phries, 2013 A rk. 286, 428 S.W. 3d. 517 (2013).
Taxes. A prospective purchaser is charged w ith knowledge o f the identity o f a ll parties
who are assessing or paying taxes. K illa m v. Texas O il & Gas C orporation, supra.
Statements in recorded instruments in the chain o f title . See, fo r example, H am ilton v.
Fowlkes, supra, where the court held that a deed w hich conveyed the W /2 N E/4 reserving “ .. .a ll
pieces and parcels o f land granted, bargained, and sold to sundry persons... in one and two acre
lots....” was sufficient to create inquiry notice.
Reformation. A party who is considering purchasing a tract o f real property must
recognize that it is always possible someone w ill bring an action fo r reformation, and establish
that a recorded instrument means something other than what it says (for example, a mineral
reservation that does not appear on the face o f the recorded deed). M auldin v. Snowden, 2011
Ark. App. 630, 386 S.W. 3d. 560 (2011).
Im perfect title . “ One who purchases from a grantor who does not have an apparently
perfect record title is not a bona fide purchaser fo r value w ithout notice.” Phelps v. Justiss O il
Company, 291 A rk. 538, 726 S.W. 2d. 662 (1987). Seriously? I do not believe I have ever seen
“ an apparently perfect record title ” in a ll o f the years I have been reading title . I f you take this
language at face value, and consider it in the lig h t o f the reality that record title in the State o f
Arkansas is rarely perfect, this case says that there is no such thing as a recording act in the State
o f Arkansas.
W ild deeds. W ild deeds are inquiry notice. K illa m v. Texas O il & Gas C orporation.
Think about that one fo r a minute. You are reading an abstract which actually has a perfect
chain o f title , unbroken from patent to the present day, no blemishes o f any kind. You also have
what appears to be a w ild deed, in which the parties to the instrument do not appear anywhere in
the perfect record title . K illa m says that the w ild deed is nevertheless inquiry notice o f an
unrecorded instrument. Certainly far afield from anything resembling “ actual notice.”
Legal descriptions. In Rice v. Welch M otor Company, 95 A rk. App. 100, 234 S.W. 3d.
327 (2006), one o f the calls in the recorded deed was “ thence northerly along flood line o f lake
about 110 feet to center o f the valley to the D .D. Glover lo t corner.” The court held that the
foregoing was sufficient to constitute inquiry notice o f a previously executed but subsequently
recorded deed from the common grantor to D.D. Glover, which overlapped this deed by
approximately 15 feet.
You have to assume anything the seller tells you is a lie. In Woods v. W right, 254 Ark.
297, 493 S.W. 2d. 129 (1973), the seller had entered into an unrecorded contract o f sale in 1966.
In 1969 he sold the property to a th ird party. In connection w ith that transaction, he told the third
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party about the unrecorded contract o f sale, but represented to the third party that the purchaser
had defaulted and that the contract was cancelled. It turned out this statement was false. The
court concluded that the third party should have questioned the veracity o f the seller’s statement
and inquired directly o f the purchasers as to the status o f the contract.
Common grantor. In Brew er v. Fletcher, 210 A rk. 110, 194 S.W. 2d. 668 (1946) the
first, unrecorded instrument was a tim ber deed. The second, recorded conveyance was a
certificate o f purchase at a tax sale. The court there said that the unrecorded tim ber deed
prevailed, on die ground that “ The said statute refers to subsequent purchasers from the common
grantor,” and the parties did not acquire their interests from a common grantor. I cannot explain
this one. It isn’t really an inquiry notice case, but it does serve to illustrate the extent to which
the courts have emasculated the recording act. The parties were clearly asserting claims through
a common grantor, and in any event the statute says no such thing.
Adverse possession. Assume you do not have a perfect record title , but at the same tim e
you have what appears to be perfect adverse possession title . The Arkansas Supreme Court says
too bad, so sad - recording is irrelevant. In Taylor v. Scott, a m ineral deed conveying an
undivided one-half interest in minerals was executed in 1937 by the person who then held record
title . In 1938, the person who was in actual possession executed a deed to a subsequent purchaser
fo r value. The subsequent purchaser went into possession, assessed and paid taxes, and clearly
established adverse possession title . The unrecorded mineral deed was fin a lly recorded in 1956.
The court said that the unrecorded mineral deed won, w ithout even discussing inquiry notice, on
the ground that the recording act does not apply to subsequent purchasers o f adverse possession
title rather than record title .
“ When a lawyer examines an abstract o f title and finds that the apparent
owner’ s title rests only on adverse possession, a rare situation, he is at
once on notice that there may be flaws in the title ....” Taylor v. Scott, 285
A rk. 102, 685 S.W. 2d. 160 (1985).
I also call your attention to the court’ s comment that title resting on adverse possession is
“ a rare situation” . The author was evidently not fam iliar w ith Arkansas title .
Tax title. The Arkansas Supreme Court has also held that “ The recording statute benefits
a subsequent purchaser from the common grantor, not a purchaser at a tax sale.” Taylor v. Scott,
supra , citing as support fo r the statement Brewer v. Fletcher, supra {Brew er v. F letcher says no
such thing).
V III.

Conclusion

The title o f this paper suggests that the recording act’ s usefulness as a rule o f property in
the State o f Arkansas ended recently. The title is misleading. The truth o f the matter is that the
usefulness o f Arkansas’ recording act has always been illusory.
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In the introduction to this paper I stated that I would conclude by attempting to state the
current rules o f property in the State o f Arkansas w ith respect to how one goes about determining
who owns real property. I suggest the follow ing:
1.

Examine record title . I f there is anything in the record title which is inconsistent
w ith a “ perfect” record title , get to the bottom o f it.

2.

Compare the record o f tax assessments and tax payments (both surface and
m ineral) w ith record title . I f there are any inconsistencies or discrepancies, get to
the bottom o f it. Note - since there is always the possibility o f an unrecorded
mineral deed in which minerals were severed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court
says that the severance was effective at the tim e the deed was executed and
delivered (Taylor v. Scott, supra), your inquiry into taxes w ill need to extend from
patent to the present day.

3.

Actual possession. V e rify the identity o f everyone who has been in actual
possession, from patent to the present day. Again, i f there are any inconsistencies
or discrepancies between actual possession and record title , get to the bottom o f it.

4.

Examine a ll w ild deeds, track down the parties to a ll w ild deeds, and verify what
happened. Note that this is an interesting requirement, given the fact that
Arkansas is a grantor-grantee index state, and finding a ll w ild deeds requires that
you search by legal description.

5.

Find and record a ll lost and unrecorded deeds. Again, good luck w ith this one.

I f you are able to fu lfill each o f the fo llo w ing requirements, you w ill be as certain as you
can possibly be that you have accurately identified the true owner. I w ill not, however, te ll you
that completing each o f the foregoing chores w ill absolutely guarantee you an accurate result. In
m y opinion, the decisions o f the Arkansas Supreme Court have created a situation where the
public policy reasons underlying rules o f property in general and the recording act specifically
have been thrown under the bus, and replaced w ith a case-by-case analysis o f the equities o f each
specific situation, resulting in a nightmare fo r parties who rely on mineral title and a cornucopia
fo r lawyers who make their liv in g resolving title disputes.
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N otice. Inform ation; the re su lt o f observation, w hether
by the senses or the m ind; knowledge of the existence of
a fa ct or state of affairs; the means o f knowledge.
Intelligence by whatever means communicated. Koehn
v. C entral N at. Ins. Co. o f Omaha, Neb., 187 Kan. 192,
354 P.2d 352, .358. A ny fa ct w hich would put an ordi
n a rily prudent person on in q u iry. State ex re l. Gleason
v. R ickhoff, Mo.App., 541 S.W.2d 47, 50. That w hich
im parts inform ation to one to be notified. Greene v.
Ives, 25 Conn.Sup. 356, 204 A.2d 412, 415.
Notice in its legal sense is inform ation concerning a
fact, actually communicated to a person by an autho
rized person, o r actually derived by him from a proper
source, and is' regarded in law as "actual” when the
person sought to he affected by it knows thereby of the
existence o f the p a rticu la r fact in question. U nited
States v . Tuteur, C .A H I., 215 F.2d 415. I t is knowledge
o f facts w hich would n a tu ra lly lead an honest and
prudent person to make in q u iry, and does n o t necessar
ily mean knowledge o f a ll the facts. Wayne Bldg. &
Loan Co. o f Wooster v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St.2d 195,
228 N.E,2d 841, 847, 40 0 .0.2d 182. In another sense,
"notice” means inform ation, an advice, or w ritte n warn
ing, in more or less form al shape, intended to apprise a
person of some proceeding in w hich his interests are
involved, or inform ing him o f some fact w hich i t is his
rig h t to know and the duty o f the no tifyin g party to
communicate.
Fed.R. C ivil P. 5(a) requires th a t every w ritte n notice
be served upon each o f the parties.
A person has notice o f a fa ct i f he knows the fact, has
reason to know it, should know it, or has been given
n otification o f it. Restatement, Second, Agency § 9.
Notice m ay be either (1) statutory, i.e., made so by
legislative enactment; (2) actual, w hich brings the
knowledge o f a fa ct d ire ctly home to the party; or (3)
constructive. Constructive notice may be subdivided
into: (a) W here there exists actual notice of m atter, to
w hich equity has added constructive notice of facts,
w hich an in q u iry a fte r such m atter would have elicited;
and (b) where there has been a designed abstinence from
in q u iry fo r the very purpose o f escaping notice.
See also Adequate notice; Charged; Due notice; imme
diate notice; Imputed notice; Judicial notice; Knowledge;
Legal notice; Publication; Reasonable notice.
A ctu a l notice. A ctual notice has been defined as notice
expressly and actu a lly given, and brought home to the
p a rty directly. The te rm “ actual notice,” however, is
generally given a w ider meaning as embracing two
classes, express and im plied; the form er includes a ll
knowledge o f a degree above th a t w hich depends upon
collateral inference, or w hich imposes upon the party
the fu rth e r d uty o f in q u iry; the la tte r imputes know l
edge to the p a rty because he is shown to be conscious o f
having the means of knowledge. In th is sense actual
notice is such notice as is positively proved to have been
given to a p a rty d ire ctly and personally, or such as he is

presumed to have received personally because the evi
dence w ith in his knowledge was sufficient to pu t him
upon inquiry.
Averment o f notice. The statem ent in a pleading th a t
notice has been given.
Commercial law. A person has "notice” o f a fact when:
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or (b) he has received
a notice or n otification o f it; or (c) from a ll the facts and
circumstances known to him a t the tim e in question he
has reason to know th a t i t exists. A person "knows” or

has "knowledge” of a fa ct when he has actual knowledge
o f it. "Discover” or "learn” or a word or phrase of
sim ila r im p o rt refers to knowledge ra th e r than to rea
son to know. The tim e and circumstances under w hich
a notice or notification may cease to be effective are not
determined by the U.C.C. U.C.C. § 1-201(25).
A person "notifies” or "gives” a notice or n otification
to another by taking such steps as m ay be reasonably
required to inform the other in ordinary course w hether
or not such other actually comes to know o f it. A
person "receives” a notice or n otification when: (a) it
comes to his attention; or (bj i t is duly delivered at the
place of business through w hich the contract was made
or a t any other place held out by him as the place fo r
receipt o f such communications. U.C.C. § 1-201(26).
U nder the U niform Commercial Code, the law on
"notice,” actual or inferable, is precisely the same
w hether the instrum ent is issued to a holder or negotiat
ed to a holder. Eldon’s Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v.
M e rrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Sm ith, Inc., 296 M inn.
130, 207 N.W.2d 282, 287.
Constructive notice. Constructive notice is inform ation
or knowledge o f a fa ct im puted by law to a person
(although he may not actually have it), because he could
have discovered the fa ct by proper diligence, and his
situation was such as to cast upon h im the duty o f
. in q u irin g in to it. E very person who has actual notice o f
circumstances sufficient to p u t a prudent man upon
in q u iry as to a p a rticu la r fact, has constructive notice o f
th e fa ct its e lf in a ll cases in w hich, by prosecuting such
in q u iry, he m ight have learned such fact.
Constructive "notice” includes im plied actual notice
and in q u iry notice. F. P. Baugh, Inc. v. L ittle Lake
Lum ber Co., C.A.CaI., 297 F.2d 692, 696.
Express notice. Express notice embraces not only
knowledge, b u t also th a t w hich is communicated by
d ire ct inform ation, either w ritte n or oral, from those
who are cognizant of the fact communicated. See also
A ctu a l notice, above.
Im p lie d notice. Im plied notice is one o f the varieties o f
actual notice (not constructive) and is distinguished from
"express” actual notice. I t is notice inferred or im puted
to a p a rty by reason of his knowledge o f facts or circum 
stances collateral to the m ain fact, of such a character
as to put h im upon in q u iry, and w hich, i f the in q u iry
were followed up w ith due diligence, would lead him
d e fin ite ly to the knowledge o f the m ain fact. "Im plied
notice” is a presum ption o f fact, re la tin g to w hat one
can learn by reasonable in q u iry, and arises from actual
notice of circumstances, and not from constructive no
tice. O r as otherwise defined, im plied notice may be
said to exist where the fact in question lies open to the
knowledge o f the party, so th a t the exercise o f reason
able observation and watchfulness would not fa ll to
apprise him o f it, although no one has to ld him o f i t in
so m any words.
Personal notice. Communication of notice o ra lly or in
w ritin g (according to the circumstances) d ire ctly to the
person affected or to be charged, as distinguished from
constructive or im plied notice, and also from notice
im puted to h im because given to his agent or representa
tive . See A ctu a l notice; Express notice, above.
P ublic notice. Notice given to the public generally, or to
the entire com m unity, or to a ll whom i t may concern.
Such m ust commonly be published in a1newspaper of
general circulation. See also Publication.
Reasonable notice. Such notice or inform ation o f a fact
as m ay fa irly and properly be expected or required in
the p a rtic u la r circumstances.

